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·� ...

INTRODUCTION

Trade issues are rarely discussed in isolation from other p olicy
issues. The conference that led to the Havana charter for an In
ternational Trade Organization (ITO) was the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment. Chapter II of the charter
assigned to the ITO the task of resolving the most pressing eco
nomic problems of the late 1940s, including attaining full em
ployment, eliminating balance·ofpayments disequilibria, action
against inflationary or deflationary pressures, and p romoting fair
labor standards. Chapter III committed the ITO's members to
cooperation on economic development and reconstruction, and
chapters III and V established the ITO as a forum for negotiating
agreements on technology transfer, foreign investment, double
taxation, and restrictive business practices, as well as commodity
agreements (ICITO 1948) .
While the Havana charter was never adopted, its chapter on
commercial policy survived in the form of the G ATT. Linkages
taken over into the original GATT concerned balance-of-payments
disequilibria and competition, to which a linkage b etween trade
and development was subsequently added .
Under the WTO,
commitments on trade in goods have now been linked with
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commitments on intellectual property rights th rough an integrated
dispute settlement mechanism .
When the Uruguay Round was brought to a close in April
1994 at the Marrakesh ministerial, the list of linkages with trade
proposed by various speakers included environmental policies, in
ternationally recognized labor standards, competition policy, com
pany law, foreign investment, immigration policies, development, po
litical stability, and alleviation of poverty (GATT Document
MTN, TNC/45 [MIN], 12) . Only one of these proposals was ac
cepted: the Decision on Trade and Environment provides for the
WTO to continue the work of the G ATT on environment
(GATT 1994, 469) . Efforts to link trade with labor standards did
not succeed at the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore in De
cember 1996, but two working groups were established to study
the relationship between trade and investment and the intersec
tion between trade and competition, respectively.
As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, linkages between
trade and other policy areas have long been a feature of the multi
lateral trade order, and recent events suggest an intensification of
the trend. The pursuit of domestic policy objectives through the
multilateral trade order raises fundamental issues for the newly
established WTO . Will such l inkages be beneficial or harmful to
the young institution? Will the attainment of domestic p olicy ob
jectives be furthered or frustrated by their integration into the
world trade order? Will regimes established in disparate policy
areas mutually reinforce or weaken each other when interacting
in a single treaty with an integrated enforcement mechanism?
This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by exam
ining the experience of the GATT with the linkages made be
tween trade and balance-of-payments matters, development poli
cies, and objectives of antitrust policies. This p aper argues that
the integration of these subject matters into the multilateral trade
order undermined both the trade order and the attainment of the
objectives in those nontrade policy areas. At least two important
lessons can be drawn from this experience: first, the pursuit of
domestic policy objectives through trade policy instruments is not
judicable and therefore leads to a de-legalization of i nternational
trade relations; and second, exemptions from trade po licy disci
plines designed to permit the pursuit of domestic policy o bjectives
attract protectionist forces that eventually subject that o bjective to
their ends. The application of these lessons to the trade and envi
ronment linkage is considered in detail.
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THE PURSUIT OF DOMESTIC POLICY OBJECTIVES THROUGH
THE GATT

2.1.

Trade and lvfonetary Policies

Within nations, trade p o licy and monetary policy are con
ducted in isolation. Trade po lic ies are basically structural policies
determined by legislators for long periods of time, whiie mone
tary policies a re conducted on a daily basis by central banks, often
politically i n dependent of the executive and legis l at i ve branches.
Trade and monetary policies are generally implemented with dif
ferent instruments: trade policies with tariffs, quotas, and similar
measures; monetary poli cies with interventions in -che exchange
and money market s
The architects of the postwar economic system nevertheless
considered that it was nece ss a ry to link these two po licy areas.
GATT co ntract ing parties were permitted to impose import re
st ri ction s for the pu rpo se of correcting a balance-of-payments
deficit; in other words, to use trade policy instruments to achieve
monetary objectives. According to art icle XII of the GATT,
which applies to all WTO membe rs, and se ctio n B of article
XVIII, which applies only to developing count r i es (GATT 1994,
501, 512), a 'X'TO member may impo se import re st r i ction s to
safeg'uard its external fi nancial position p rovided the restrictions
do not exceed those ne ces sary to prevent a serious decline, or
achieve a reasonable i ncrease, in its mone ta ry reserves. The re
strictions need not be withdrawn even if a change in monetary
polici es would make them unnecessary.
The 1979 Declaration on Trade 1vleasures Taken for Balance
of-Payments P urposes of the GATT contracti ng parties recog
nized that "trade measu res are in general an inefficient means to
maintain or restore balance-of-payments equilibrium" (GATT
1978-79, 205). This statement is regarded by most economists as a
truism. S i nce the fundamental cause for a balance-of-payments
deficit is normally an excess of domestic con su m pti o n over do
mestic production, the solution lies in most cases in restrictive fis
cal and monetary policies that help reduce the overall level of
consumption. Imposing import controls on particular products
will influence the pattera of domestic consumption but cannot
have any predictable and durable impact on the overall level of
Like devaluations) import controls
domestic consumption.
.
.
'
.
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imports <J.nd not exports, and therefore constitute at best "half a
devaluation" (GATT 1983, 16).
In practice, the trade measures imposes under articles XII and
XVII:B of the GATT have not been applied across the board to
all imports and have thus distorted the price relationshi ps not
only between imports and exports but between different catego
ries of imports . Such distortions inevitably entail addition<JJ inef
ficiencies, widening the gap between domestic production and
For these reasons, the only p redict abl e conse
consumption.
quence of an import restriction imposed under the G ATT's bal
ance-of-payments provisions is a worsening of the balance-of
payments deficit.
What practical use did the G ATT contracting parties make of
the balance-of-payments provision? In the immediate postwar pe
riod, they were mainly invoked by European countries struggling
to achieve the convertibility of their currencies . In the 1960s,
when convertibility had b een achieved, many European coun
tries, eschewing devaluations, used the provision to justify import
restrictions designed to maintain the exchange value of their cur
rencies. In 1971, the United States invoked article XII to justify
an import surcharge imposed to force its trading partners to ac
cept a revaluation of their currencies in relation to the dollar.
Since the replacement of the International lvionetary Fund's
(Hv1F) par value system by a system of flexible exchange rates in
the early 1970s, industrialized countries ceased almost completely
to invoke the G ATT's balance-of-payments provisions (Roessler
1975) .
These provisions then became the almost exclusive preserve of
the developing counties, which invoked them, often for decades
or longer, as a legal justification for their import substitution
policies . By doing so, developing countries avoided the proce
dural strictures of G ATT article XVII:A and C, which were
meant to be the legal basis for restrictive import measures im
posed for development purposes. As import substitution policies
became less popular and the pressure on the more advanced de
veloping countries to liberalize grew, they began to disinvoke
.
'
In 1995 and
1
"1
vomntanq
t he 1oa 1 ance-o f-payments prov1s10ns.
1996, seven WTO members ceased to apply article XVII:B or gave
undertakings to disinvoke it. In early 1997 the Hv'IP found that
India did not have a balance-of-payments problem justifying an
invocation of article XVII:B. The only members still consulting
in the \):?TO Co.mmittee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions
.
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(BOP Committee) are Bangladesh, Hungary, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. Of these countries, all except Hungary
have invoked article XVIII:B since their ac ce s sio n to the GA TT.1
The determination as to what constitutes a serious decline or a
reasonable increase in reserves is made by the BOP Committee on
the basis of a determination by the IMF. According to article
XV:2 of the GATT, the IMF's views on this matter must be ac
cepted by the WTO (GATT 1994, 507). Under t he current
monetary system, however, the IMF faces an impossible task.
The level of import controls necessary to resolve the reserve prob
lem depends on the level of the exchange rate: the greater the de
valuation, the less protection will be required to safeguard the ex
ternal financial position. In the past, the IMF's par value system
dictated the choice of the exchange rate, namely the exchange rate
agreed with the IMF, but under the current monetary system, the
choice of any exchange rate by the IMF would be arbitrary. If it
chooses the exchange rate that prevails after the introduction of
the import restrictions, its determination would only reflect what
the market has already decided and automatically sanction the
level of import controls actually applied. If it chooses the ex
change rate that would be required to eliminate the need for the
restrictions, it would effectively eliminate the right under articles
XII and XVIII:B to impose restrictions. In short, the criteria that
determine the level of restrictions have not been capable of ra
tional application for more than two decades-except for the de
termination that a country has no balance-of-payments problems
and therefore the level of restrictions should be zero-but the
GATT, and now the WTO, have nevertheless not adopted any
other criteria.
The linkage between trade and monetary matters has helped
neither the GATT nor the IMF in the pursuit of their basic objec
tives. The right of all WTO members to impose import restric
tions in the event of a balance-of-payments deficit creates signifi
cant legal uncertainty in international trade relations, and
nourishes the illusion that import controls can reduce a deficit. It
is disquieting that the United States could now, consistent with its
WTO obligations and section 122 of its Trade Act of 1974, im
pose a surcharge on a wide range on its imports, or that China
could, once it becomes a WTO member, withdraw all the market1

Information supplied by the WTO Secretariat.
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access commitments now painfully being negotiated in the process
of its accession to the WTO simply by writing a letter to the di
rector general of the WTO. In practice, the use of balance-of
payments provision by developing countries deprived them of the
possibility to invoke GATT disciplines to ward off domestic pro
tectionist pressures. The restrictions originally imposed in a
payments crisis often created their own pressure groups, making
their subsequent removal politically difficult or impossible. As a
result, the countries disinvoking the balance-of-payments provi
sions generally required long transition periods to phase out the
restnctlons.
From the perspective of the monetary order, the balance-of
payments provisions of the GATT have also not had a favorable
effect. Article IV:l of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF states
that "the essential purpose of the international monetary system is
to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods,
services, and capital among countries" (IMF 1978, 6). However,
the GATT balance-of-payments provisions allowed governments
to postpone devaluations and therefore to mask the most visible
sign of fiscal or monetary mismanagement. By helping govern
ments postpone the political consequences of mismanagement,
these provisions created a permanent moral hazard for govern
ments, undermining the smooth operation of the international
monetary system.
The right of GATT contracting parties to impose IMF
sanctioned trade controls in payments crises originally served to
promote the goals of convertibility and of exchange rate stability,
considered by the architects of the postwar international eco
nomic order to be of a higher p riority than trade liberalization.
Now the convertibility of the major currencies has been achieved
and exchange rate stability as such has ceased to be a goal of the
IMF. Nevertheless the IMF insisted throughout the Uruguay
Round on the maintenance of GATT's balance-of-payments pro
visions and even on their extension to the General Agreement of
Trade in Services (GATS) . 2 One explanation is that the balance
of-payments provisions give the IMF the possibility to approve
trade measures that permit its members in payments crises to use
their scarce financial resources to reimburse their debts rather
2 See the Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organiza
tion with the International Monetary Fund (GATT 1994, 447), and articles XI
and XII of the GATS (GATT 1994, 337).
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than w pay fer additional imports. The previsions sought by the
IMF thus ?"0ive it the comoetence to aoprove measures designed to
protect its own financial interests and those of its members.
The response to the above observations might be that the link
between trade and monetary matters is a fact of political life,
without w·hich the world trade order would not be politically re
alistic. In reply, it could be pointed out that the world trade or
der should not pave the way to disaster but react appropriately
when it occurs. Debt crises are also a political fact o:f life, but the
creation of a formal legal framework for the rescheduling of debts
has been wisely avoided . Rather than granting WTO members an
almost unconditional right to impose trade controls for decades
merely because of a payments deficit, the WTO should grant ad
hoc time-bound waivers when grave crises arise, on conditions tai
lored to the circumstances of the case. The explicit and perma
nent linkage between trade and monetary matters incorporated i n
1947 into the G ATT has neither an economic rationale nor a po
litical rationale and serves neither the purpose of the worid trade
order nor that of the international monetary system.
.t

2.2.

r

.L..

\-'

Trade and Development Policies

The central theme of international economic diplomacy in the
1960s and 1970s was third world development. The Charter on
the Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the United
T"hrions in 197 4, made all aspects of international economic coop
eration subservient to the goal of development (General Assembly
resolution 3281 [XXIX] of 12 December 1974) . In the G ATT de
cision on "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reci
procity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries"
(GATT 1978-79, 203), the principle of nonreciprocity in trade ne
gotiations between developed and developing countries was rec
ognized, developed countries were permitted to accord tariff pref
erences to developing countries under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), and developing countries were accorded the
right to exchange preferences among themselves in the name of
coilective autonomy.
Today, the ne�· international economic order is long forgot
ten, and the charter lies in the waste paper basket of history, De
clining tariffs eroded the commercial attraction of the GSP, and it
never achieved its ethical mission-to create greater em.1alitv
1'
among natlons-oecause Lh e b enents
r· were concentrate d on a small
.

1
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group of highly advanced developing countries. The principle of
nonreciprocity had on balance a negative impact on trade liberali
zation: rather than in du cing developed countries to liberalize uni
laterally imports in sectors of export interest to the developing
countries, such as textiles and agriculture, the principle provided
developing countries with a justification for refusing to make
market-access commitments and to sign the agreements on non
tariff measures concluded in the Tokyo Round. As a result of the
principle of nonreciprocity, developing countries were deprived
of the main benefit of GATT membership, namely the exposure
to a system of rules and procedures that help correct the protec
tionist bias in trade policymaking, and of the benefits of adher
ence to codes of good government practice incorporated in the
Tokyo Round agreements (Hudec 1987). The cause of develop
ment was manifestly not served by releasing developing countries
from their GATT obligations.
The trade and development linkage eliminated the rule of law
in north-south trade relations. The most-favored-nation rule was
removed, but no other rule of conduct was put in its place. The
beneficiaries of the principle of differential treatment were never
defined. The GSP permits the donor countries to unilaterally de
termine the beneficiaries and to withdraw the preferences at any
time, which led developed countries to impose numerous condi
tions on the grant of the preferences. Thus, the main p reference
donors, the United States and the European Community, each
make GSP benefits conditional on the adoption of certain labor
standards, cooperation in drug control, and many other policy
conditions. 3 The nonreciprocal nature of the preferences thus
3 Under Title V of the United States Trade Act of 1974, a developing coun
try cannot receive preferences if inter alia the country expropriates or otherwise
seizes control of l?roperty owned by a U.S. citizen, including patents, trade
marks, and copynghrs; repudiates an agreement with a U.S. citizen; imposes
taxes or other excations with respect to property of a U.S. citizen; refuses to
cooperate with the United States to prevent narcotic drugs from entering the
U mted States unlawfully; aids or abets any individual or group that has com
mitted an act of international terrorism; denies its workers internationally rec
o�nized rights, including acceptable minimum wages; refrains from enforcing
arbitral awards; is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries.
Under article 3:2, 7, 8, and 9 of Council Regulation (EC) 3281/94 of 19 De
cember 1994 (Official JournaJ of the European Communities, 31 December
1994, no. L 348/1), the European Community makes GSP benefits available to
countries that conduct a campaign to combat drugs; apply the conventions of
the International Labor Organization on the freedom or association, on the
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turned out to be an illusion: rather than reciprocating in the field
of trade, the developing countries were forced to make conces
sions in other policy areas without receiving legally guaranteed
benefits in return. The new law of north-south relations con
sisted essentially of clauses enabling, but not obiiging, developed
countries to accord trade advantages under unilaterally deter
mined conditions. What was hailed by some authors as "a new
law of development" (Hubbard 1979, 92) consisted e sse ntially of
rules delegalizing trade relations between devel op ed and develop.
mg countnes.
The historical failure of the GATT in this area was the ab
sence of an appropriate respo nse to the genuine problems that
low-income states may have had in applying G ATT p rinciples.
For instance, certain countries with a fiscal infrastructure i nsuffi
cient to raise revenue through domestic taxes could have been
given the right to levy import duties for revenue purp oses. In
stead, the GATT responded to the broad political demands of the
Group of 77, a coalition spanning the richest and poorest develop
ing countries with no common trade interests. This group was
able to formulate only the demand to exempt all of its member
ship form the rules of the G ATT, and make them all eligible for
GSP. I\T o n e of the instruments the GATT adopted i n response to
the demands of the developing countries was therefore targeted to
the real and definable problems of these states and to those of the
poorest among them.
.

2.3.

Trade and Competition Policies

At present, the o nly provision in the WTO agreements that
links trade with competitio n is art i cle VI of the GATT, which
declares that dumping "is to be c o nd e mn ed if it causes or threat
ens material injury to an established industry" (GA.TT 1994, 493)
and permits the levying of duties to offset such dumping.
Dumping and antidumping have been extensively analyzed in
the literature on imperfect co mpetit ion . At t he i r o rigi n, anti-

protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively, and on the m ini
D,1�m age for admiss10n to emp loy ment; apply sta � dards refating t_o the sustain
able manaoement of forests; do not pract1ce any rorm of forced labor; do not
manifest s ortcomings in customs controls on export or transit of drugs; com
ply with international conventions on money laundering; do not engage in un
fair trading practices, such as d�scr�mination agains; ��e European Community,
comply 'Nlt h market-access obbgat10ns under the '0//.i 0 agreements.

h
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dumping p rov1s10ns in the international trade agreements wr:re
intended to protect competition against anticompetitive oractices,
and in particular to combat predatory pricing (Hindley and
:tv1esserlin 1996). The general conclusion is that predatory pricing
is only in exceptional situations a rational strategy of cor�panies
locked in battle for control of a market and th at, in most casesj
the antidumping provisions have been used in circumstances in
which predatory pricing cannot occur. Thus, it was found rhat
"most antidumping cases involve products with a considerable
number of producers at the global level, none of whom has a
dominant share of global output" (Hinkley and 1v1esserlin 1996,
21). As a result, there is no economic rationale for the vast major
ity of antidumping cases.
Even on the assumption that predatory pricing may occur and
will need to be suppressed by governments to safeguard competi
tion, there would still not be any justification for special rules that
differentiate between domestic and imported products. Article
III, the GATT's national treatment provision, and article XX:d of
the GATT's general exceptions allow WTO members to apply
their competition policies equally to all sources of predatory pric
ing and to take in respect of imported products all measures nec
essary to secure compliance with those policies. The only func
tion of the WTO antidumping provisions is therefore to permit
WTO members to apply to imported products competition rules
that are more onerous than those applied domestically.
Article VI of the GATT is supplemented by the -WTO
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994
(Antidumping Agreement), which regulates the application of an
tidumping measures at the national level in great detail. Such an
agreement fosters the illusion that the rule of law applies in this
area. In fact, however, the agreement leaves WTO members with
an extrernely wide range of discretion in determining whether in
jurious dumping has occurred, and its article XVII:6 explicitly ex
e mp t s the exercise of this discretion from a full review- by WTO
panels and the 'X!TO Appellate Body (GATT 1994, 193). The ex
ercise of t he right to. tak� ant_idu?Jpin� �eas�res is c?nsequently
_
_
not submitted to JUdicable cntena and e1tect1ve multrlateral con
r:ol, notwithstanding the plethora of 'N'TO mles on their applica
tiOn.

The origin of antidumping provisions in the GATT was in
nocuous, and such measures were rarely applied in the first two
decades of the GATT's existence. As other authors have amD1Y
-'-
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dumping prov1s10ns in the international trade agreements were
intended to protect competition against anticompetitive practices,
and in particular to combat predatory pricing (Hindley and
Messerlin 1996). The general conclusion is that predatory pricing
is only in exceptional situations a rational strategy of companies
locked in battle for control of a market and that, in most cases,
the antidumping provisions have been used in circumstances in
which predatory pricing cannot occur. Thus, it was found that
"most antidumping cases involve products with a considerable
number of producers at the global level, none of whom has a
dominant share of global output" (Hinkley and Messerlin 1996,
2 1). As a result, there is no economic rationale for the vast major
ity of antidumping cases.
Even on the assumption that predatory pricing may occur and
will need to be suppressed by governments to safeguard competi
tion, there would still not be any justification for special rules that
differentiate between domestic and imported products. Article
III, the GATT's national treatment provision, and article XX:d of
the GATT's general exceptions allow WTO members to apply
their competition policies equally to all sources of predatory pric
ing and to take in respect of imported products all measures nec
essary to secure compliance with those policies. The only func
tion of the \VTO antidumping provisions is therefore to permit
WTO members to apply to imported products competition rules
that are more onerous than those applied domestically.
Article VI of the GATT is supplemented by the WTO
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1 994
(Antidumping Agreement), which regulates the application of an
tidumping measures at the national level in great detail. Such an
agreement fosters the illusion that the rule of law applies in this
area. In fact, however, the agreement leaves WTO members with
an extremely wide range of discretion in determining whether in
jurious dumping has occurred, and its article XVII: 6 explicitly ex
empts the exercise of this discretion from a full review by WTO
panels and the \X'TO Appellate Body (GATT 1 994, 193) . The ex
ercise of the right to take antidumping measures is consequently
not submitted to judicable criteria and effective multilateral con
trol, notwithstanding the plethora of WTO rules on their applica
twn.

The origin of antidumping provisions in the GATT was in
nocuous, and such measures were rarely applied in the first two
decades of the GATT's existence. As other authors have amply
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docur:'1ented, however) the p rovisions became a safe harbor for
projectionist domestic interests (Hindley and Messerlin 1 996) .
Once GATT contracting parties we re permitted to deviate fro m
t h e basic trade poli cy principles, ostensi bly to pursue competition
policy obj ectives, the political forces that these principles are to
control overwhelmed the competition p oli cy obj ectives . There is
nearly unanimity in the academic world now that the WTO's
rules on antidumping operate to p rotect competitors rather than
competition and consequently have acquired a rational that is the
complete opposite of the one they were o riginally meant to serve.
..

3.

THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT LINK: WILL HISTORY
REPEAT ITSELF?

The t rade and environment debate raises issues and subm its
the principles of the world trade o rder t o scrutiny from a new
perspective. However, there are elements in the proposals t o in
tegrate environmental concerns into the multilateral t rade o rder
that so strongly resemble aspects of the unsuccessful linkages
made between trade and other policy matters that a repetition of
past mistakes is to be feared.
Technically, t here is no conflict between environmental poli-
cies and t rade p olicies . The rules of the 'X'TO do not prescribe o r
prevent t h e attainment of any domestic policy goal i n t h e field o f
t h e environment . They are merely " negative" rules p rohibiting
policies that distinguish, openly or i n disguise, between products
and services or service suppliers as to their o rigin or destination.
Such distinctions are, however, normally not necessary t o attain
domestic environmental policy goals (Roessler 1 9 9 6b) . 'X/hy then
do so many environmental organizations consider WTO law as a
threat to domestic environmental legislation?
Their opposition is based on the fear that many laws further
ing environmental and other public interests may o nly be adopted
with elements that are contrary to WTO law . The legal con
straints imposed by WTO membership create in their view o bsta
cles to the formation of domestic political coalitions between sec
torai interests pursuing p rotecti;nist aims and publ ic-interest
groups pursuin g environmental goals, and the rulings of the
'�ITO panels put into jeopardy existing domestic laws furthering
legitimate domestic policy obj ectives for which t he re is, politi
cally, no prospect of a �<'TO-consistent solution.
As Ralph
Nader stated in his testimony befo re the U . S . Senate Finance
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Committee on the results of the Uruguay Round (16 March 1994,
photocopy): "Raw log export bans are one of the most trade re
strictive means to attain the goal of conserving our nation's for
ests. Yet, after years of debate, raw log bans were the only politi
cally feasible approach because they accommodated the interest of
providing alternative lumber processing jobs to those who would
no longer be cutting down forests. Laws with such mixed eco
nomic and social purposes, of which there are many, would likely
fall before challenge under the World Trade Organization's
rules. "
Ralph Nader is n o doubt right. And many other illustrations
can be provided to substantiate his point. Take the case, for in
stance, of the introduction of a new clean-air standard for gaso
line. Such a standard, by itself, can of course be introduced for all
gasoline without any legal constraints under WTO law. A prob
lem of WTO consistency would arise, however, if the domestic
political constraints are such that a new standard would secure a
parliamentary majority only if domestic gasoline is exempted
from the standard for five years or, to put the issue in political
economy terms, if the cost of reducing pollution is initially borne
only by nonvoting producers abroad. That discrimination would
be inconsistent with the GATT's national treatment provisions of
article III and would most likely not be justifiable under the
GATT's public policy exceptions of article XX. The five-year ex
emption violating the GATT 1994 would thus not be techn ically
necessa ry to implement a higher environmental standard (it would
in fact reduce the new standard's environmental impact during
the transition period) , but would be politically n ecessa ry to adopt
the higher standard.
Another example illustrating Nader's point is the phase-out
mechanism for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) included in the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer.
In theory, the phase-out of CFCs could have been achieved
through internal measures consistent with the national treatment
principle, for instance, a system of sales licenses. However, such a
system would have imposed only burdens on the producers of the
chemicals and would probably not have won their support. The
mechanism that was instead adopted provides for quantitative
limits on the production of CFCs in the members, combined
with a ban on imports from nonmembers, with the result that the
consumption of CFCs is reduced. Under this mechanism, the de
cline in the domestic supply of CFCs combined with the import
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controls generated rents for the domestic producers during the
phase-out period, and the scheme therefore won their support .
The import controls were thus not technically required to protect
the ozone layer, but were politically necessary to win the support
of the producers of ozone-depleting chemicals (Enders and Porges
1992) .
How can the dilemma of groups pursuing environmental goals
be accommodated in the WTO law? One approach would be to
add a provision to the GATT 1 994 permitting discriminatory
trade measures if a legitimate domestic policy goal would not be
politically attainable without that measure. However, such a
"political necessity" clause would establish a license for unprinci
pled policymaking, and the market-access rights under the WTO
agreements would therefore be submitted to the vagaries of the
domestic political process of the WTO members. A provision
with these functions, however drafted, would not mark a line be
tween international trade interests and domestic policy con
straints, and would therefore be incompatible with the rule of law
in international trade relations (Roessler 1996a) .
Environmental groups have also been concerned that a WTO
member is, under the principle of unconditional most-favored
nation treatment, unable to offset through trade measures the
economic consequences of the differences between its environ
mental policies and those of other WTO members. This concern
is reflected in the following statement by Ralph Nader ( 1 6 March
1994) :
U.S. corporations long ago learned how to pit states
against each other in a "race to the bottom" -to provide
the most permissive corporate charters, lower wages, pol
lution standards, and taxes. Often it is the federal gov
ernment's role to require states to meet higher federal
standards . . . . There is no overarching "lift up" jurisdic
tion on the world stage . . . . The Uruguay Round is crafted
to enable corporations to play this game at the global level,
to pit country against country in a race to see who can set
the lowest wage levels, the lowest environmental stan
dards, the lowest consumer safety standards. Notice this
downward bias-nations do not violate the GATT rules
by pursuing too weak consumer, labor . . . and environ
mental standards. . . . Any . . . demand that corporations
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pay their fair share of taxes, provide a decent standard of
living to their employees or limit their pollution of the air,
.
'
water an d 1LandI w1. 1,1 b e met w1t h t h e ref ram, "Y ou can t
burden us like that . If you do, we won't be able to com
oete . ·w e'll have to close down and move to a country
�hat offers us a more hospitable business climate . "
.

.

The theoretical literature on interjurisdictional competition
i ndicates that the problem described by Ralph Nader is l argely a
reflection of a desirable competition among jurisdictions and not
a race to the bottom ('X!ilson 1996) . Given that j urisdictions can
be assumed to choose environmental quality to maximize the wel
fare of residents, they have no incentive to offer firms exemptions
from taxes required to cover costs to the environment even w hen
competing for scarce capital . However, second-best situations
unavail ability of policy instruments or distortions in market
structure or both-may give rise to the adoption of inefficiently
low or too high standards; agai n, a case-by-case analysis is neces
sary .
Furthermore, if the race-to-the-bottom argument is accepted,
it would apply not only to environmental policies but to all poli
cies that affect the location of industries, including tax and sub
sidy policies, the provision of infrastructure, and p ro duction regu
lation of all kinds . Eliminatin g a race to the bottom only in the
area of environmental policies would merely displace the race into
other policy areas, for example in workers' safety. At the end of
this p rocess , there would no l onger be local jurisdictions within
federal states, and states would have to cede their policy auton
omy to i nternational authorities (Revesz 1992) .
\Xlhat would be the consequence of a new general rule i n the
'Y/TO legal system that would perm!t WTO members to apply
import taxes and restrictions designed to offset the competitive
advantages that differences in environmental and other regula
tions accord to producers abroad/ With such a rule, the law of
4 There is no provision in the WTO agreement that p ermits trade restric
tions specificallv designed to offset differences in domestic policies. \'VTO
members may {mpose countervail ing duties on p roducts that b enefit from a
domestic production subsidy. However, a countervailing duty may be imposed
even if the importing contracting p arty also accords a subs idy. Two WTO
members granting the same fiscal advantages to their steel industries may im
pose (and frequently impose in practice) countervailing duties on the steel
products exported to each other. The countervail ing-duty provisions of the
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the WTO would p rovide legal security only for the products and
services traded between pai rs of countries with identical domestic
production regulations . This would be contrary to the principle
of comparative advantage according to which nations are to ext
d'C
_C
h'
•
J
w 1cn are ott e n re f1lecte d m t .1e1
tne1r
1nerences,
p 1101t
.h r regu.ations (Bhagwati 1 996) .
IV1oreover, rhe unconditional most
favored-nation principle would be lost , and with it the peace
en genderin g impact of that principle. With a general rule that
p e rmits WTO members to eliminate the external effects of the
diffe rences between them, the \XTTO legal system could therefore
no l onger fulfill its functions.
One l egal method t o take into account the domestic p oiitical
constraints of 'JVTO members and the fear of a race-to-the-bottom
effect of trade liberalization would be to permit them to individu
ally vary their market-access commitments in accordance with
those const raints. That metho d is already available. The market
access commitments under the \\'TO agreements are made by
product (GATT) , by sector (GATS) , o r by entity (Agreement on
Government Procurement) . The schedules of commitments of
\X/TO members therefore vary significantly. Moreover, WTO
members are entitled t o renegotiate their commitments. Both
during the p rocess of negotiating the commitments and after their
acceptance, WTO members thus have the p ossibility to adjust
their trade obligations in accordance with their domestic political
constraints and the external impact of their policies. However,
this adjustment takes place at the time when market-opening
commitments are ne g otiated o r after a renegotiation based o n
reciprocity, and therefore maintains t he balance o f rights and ob
ligat ions among members .
From the perspective of 'w'TO law, the issue is t hus not
whether domestic policy constraints should be taken i nto account
or whether t rade liberalization entails a healthy competition
.

..

l

,..

.

.

WTO are therefore not p rovisions permitting measures designed to offset pol
icy divergences, but are provisions permitting the
rotection of import
competing industries contingent upon the protectio n o _ an exporting industry
i-? ano � her country. This observation can also be made in resp ect of th� provi
SJon or the GATT that exempts measures related to the e roducts of pnson la
bor from the obligations under the GATT (article XX: e) . It i s true that the
domestic policies of a not h er WTO member trigger in t his case the right to im
pose imoort controls, but that right may be exercised independently of the
o rison-labor regulations of t h e contract ing party imposing the import control.
�'\ WTO member could consequently permit the safe of products p roduced in
domestic prisons while restricting the sale of those made in foreign prisons.

r
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among jurisdictions or a destructive race to the bottom. Given
the right of each member to adjust its market-access commitments
w its perception of these issues, the real issue is w hether WTO
members should be able to react to the external repercussions of
their own domestic policy choices by unilaterally withdrawing
their market-access commitments or whether they should be able
to do so only by renegotiating their commitments. A multilateral
trade order based on the rule of law cannot but be based on the
principle of renegotiation.
There are many proposals to use the market-access opportuni
ties created by the obligations assumed under the WTO agree
ments as bargaining chips to induce other countries to change
their environmental policies, and the withdrawal of these oppor
tunities as sanctions against countries that do not cooperate in the
protection of the environment. Thus, Steve Charnovitz (1993,
282) wrote:
How can an agreement on m1mmum standards be
achieved among a hundred countries with different values
and resources? One approach is to devise a clever mix of
carrots and sticks from a diverse enough issue garden to al
low a cross-fertilization of concerns. The goal is not only
to obtain an agreement, but also to maintain its stability.
The carrots are the basic tool. Because countries face dif
ferent economic trade-offs . . . an assistance mechanism can
be developed to enable gainers to compensate losers and
rich nations to "bribe" poor ones. This assistance could be
in the form of financial aid or technology transfer . . . , or
it could be trade concessions.
The proposal to use the world trade order as a source of car
rots and sticks for the pursuit of environmental objectives is based
on three illusions. The first is generated by the image of "carrots
and sticks." "Carrot" suggests that you give something of value to
you; "stick" suggests that you inflict pain without hurting your
self. However, such sticks do not exist in international economic
relations. Here, nations can hurt others only by hurting them
selves at the same time; a trade sanction inflicts costs both on the
imposing nation and on the target nation, and the cost for the
former can sometimes exceed that of the latter. The choice is thus
not , as the image suggests, between costly subsidies and costless
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trade sanctions, but between subsidies that transfer resources from
one nation to another and trade sanctions that destroy the re
sources of both (GATT 1 99 1) .
If the image o f carrots and sticks has such currency i n the
trade and environment debate, it is probably because the costs of
trade sanctions are generally so thinly spread across populations
that they arouse little political opposition and are therefore not
taken into account in the public debate. This is probably also the
reason that a trade sanction seems to be the only stick seriously
considered in the trade and environment literature even though
the arsenal of economic sanctions contains many more sticks,
such as the interruption of financial relations, telecommunica
tions, transport services, and so forth. These other types of eco
nomic sanctions may be just as effective in obtaining commit
ments from other nations to cooperate in the protection of the
environment as trade sanctions; however, they will cause concen
trated and easily visible effects for a small group of producers and
will therefore engender greater political opposition. If one has
concluded that sanctions are required to achieve a negotiating
goal, one still needs to decide that among the sanctions available
the trade sanction is the most efficient one. The public choice on
that issue, however, is likely to be distorted by the bias that dis
torts the public choice on trade policies generally. The focus of
the trade and environment debate on trade sanctions, rather than
economic sanctions generally, is an indirect reflection of this bias.
The second illusion is that the goals of trade liberalization and
environmental protection can be obtained simultaneously in a
single negotiation. In a reciprocity-based negotiation in the
WTO, a nation will not obtain in return for its market-access
commitment an equivalent market-access commitment and com
mitments in another policy area; it will obtain only one or the
other and will therefore have to decide which of the two objec
tives to pursue. To propose that a multilateral negotiation cover
market access issues and a raising of environmental standards is
therefore to propose that nations with high environmental stan
dards pursue their trade interests or their environmental interests.
The third illusion is that the trade and environment link is a
one-way street toward better environmental protection. In any
system in which the results of reciprocity negotiations are en
forced through a right to retaliation, an issue linkage becomes a
two-way street: if market access and the protection of endangered
species were to be successfully linked in WTO negotiations, trade
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concessions could b e withdrawn in response to the failure t o p ro
tect an endangered species and vice versa. If environmentalists
.
L l1er env1 ror1menta1
�' e
see k m
the
1
t he "trad
wea p o n )) to IUrt
.
1
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"'"'O
•
1
[
1
1
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1
•
1
goals,
tney
must t h ere1ore
accept . that
otner
natwns
o ot am t 1e
"environmental weapon" t o defend their t rade interests . I-low
ever, it is totally ina propriate to make commitments on such es
sential matters as the p rotection of endangered species, where the
withdrawal from obl igations may have irreversible effects , de
pendent on the ups and downs of co mmercial p o li c i e s . The main
purpose of international b argaining is t o create regimes, systems
of rules and procedures makin g governmental actions more pre
dictable. Each of these regimes cannot furnish predict ability if i t
is constantly exposed to t h e need t o adjust t o a b reakdown i n
other regimes . That i s true for both t h e internat ional trade o rder
and international environmental law.
The inherent limitations of the cross-retaliation principle were
recognized by the negotiat o rs of the WTO agreements . Initially,
the United States, mainly with its interest in protecting w orld
wide intellectual property rights in mind, proposed that there b e
a n unbridled right of cross-retaliation under the WTO dispute set
tlement procedures. However, it subsequently revised its position
t o the effect t hat retal iation across s ectors should b e resorted t o
only if retaliation within the sector was not p r act i cal o r effe ctive.
This change reflected the fear of the United States ' banking sect o r
that cross-retaliation resulting fro m failures to observe obligations
in the field of trade in goods might upset the delicate balances of
interest b etween nations i n the field of financial services. Article
22: 3 of the D ispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) therefore
now contains eight subparagraphs which, while mai ntaining the
principle of cross-retaliation, define meticulously the circum
stances under which a WTO member mav retaliate across sect o rs
and the elements of the Uruguay Rounci' package t hat constitute
individual sectors, segregating-of course-financial services as a
separate sect o r (GATT 1 994, 423) . If e nvironmental groups did
not have the illusion of the one-way street, they would, just like
the U.S. banking community, make every effort to ensure that
t heir important cause is not throw into the crab basket of trade
.
1
1"
po�1cymaKmg
.

p
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CONCLUSION

\V'hat do the linkages between trade and domestic policy ob
jectives reviewed in this paper have in common? In each cas e , the
linkage led t o the creation of new rules permitting governments
r
. pnnc1p
. . l es of th e world t race oraer Wlthout ,
to d epart rrom
bas1c
however, establishing effective new disciplines constrainin g the
exercise of the resulting discretion. The reason was that the new
rules enabled governments to pursue monetary, development, and
competition policies with second-best policy instruments, and) as
economic theory has amply demonstrated, one cannot define in
the abstract ad in advance under what circumstances the choice of
the wrong instrument for the right policy raises welfare. Only a
case-by-case analysis is appropriate in this situation. No generally
applicable, abstract rule is therefore conceivable that would dis
tingtlish between permissible and forbidden second-best policies
on economic efficiency grounds.
The choice of the second-best policy instrument was permit
ted essentially for political reasons, that is, to exempt from GATT
disciplines the trade policy measures of governments p o l it ically
unable to pursue their monetary, development, or competition
policies with more direct and efficient policy instruments. How
ever, a GATT rule that defines the domestic political circum
stances that would justify the resort to a second-best policy in
strument is impossible to craft. For instance, in the case of
balance-of-payments policies implemented through trade measure,
such a rule would have to provide for something like the follow
ing: "A WTO member incurring a serious balance-of-payments
deficit may, instead of devaluing its currency, impose an import
surcharge if it demonstrates that its government would, if it were
to devalue, lose the next election/be toppled by riots/ encounter
serious problems in containing wage demands." It is obvious that
such a rule would not be seriously considered even though it
would precisely reflect the political purpose of the GATT's bal
ance-of-payments exception. A fundamental lesson that can be
drawn from the GATT's links with monetary, development, and
competition policies is that, upon entering the realm of the sec
ond-best, the realm of the rule of law is left, and any such link
therefore entails a delegalization of international trade relations.
Each of the linkages reviewed above was made to harness the
instruments of trade policy for domestic policy objectives. In all
three cases, however, the protectionist forces freed by the elimina1

'
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tion of the trade policy disciplines seized the occasion and over
whelmed the domestic policy objective . Thus, the antidumping
provisions, originally designed to protect competition, now oper
ate exclusively to protect competitors. Another conclusion that
can therefore be drawn from the exoerience
under the GATT is
�
that, if domestic policy objectives are not pursued in a trade
neutral manner, they attract protectionist interests that will tend
to undermine the attainment of these objectives. As a result nei
ther the world trade order nor the causes such linkages were
meant to serve benefited from the link.
Many of the proposals to pursue environmental objectives
through the multi-lateral trade order have features that resembie
those of past failed linkages between trade policy instruments and
domestic policy objectives. Again proposals are made that would
permit the use of trade measures in the pursuit of policy objec
tives that cannot be attained efficiently with trade policy instru
ments. And, again, the hoped-for cross-fertilization is likely to
turn into cross-contamination. The fundamental illusion that
prompts these proposals is that the link between environmental
policies and trade policies is a one-way street and that it is there
fore possible to use the political pressures behind trade policy in
struments for one's policy objectives without in turn being sub
jected to these pressures. In fact, however, that linkage, as the
previous linkages of its kind, is likely to turn into a disservice to
the important cause it is meant to advance.
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